Executive Summary
We conducted a rapid assessment ethnography of the execution and implementation of the CSP by the GoRTT:
The overall local political culture impacted Governmental decision-making and carried within it the seeds of the discontinuation of the CSP.
Five fundamental insights emerged out of our research:
Insight #1: Local political culture and institutions. The RAE suggested that the logic and rationalities of local politics pivots and functions on short-term thinking, political competition, quick wins and election cycles. In contrast to development agencies who may think and plan projects in terms that are longer or do not coincide with election cycles. The suggestion here is the CSP was victim to the expediencies of local politics first and the expediencies of development planning were a secondary consideration. Or put another way, the institutional structures and cultures of GoRTT and the IDB were made for different purposes.
Insight #2: Senior members of local government often substitute formal processes for informal ones. The RAE suggested there is a tendency amongst some senior members of both main political parties locally to make decisions based on their own knowledge/morality, social connections, or reaction to media coverage. This creates a situation where evidence-based decision-making is often not the main manner through which decisions are taken at the senior level and contributes to a culture of decision-making more generally that is evidence-averse.
Insight #3: Local governmentality is built on culture of data illiteracy. In the context of how individuals make decisions and execute governance (also known as governmentality) within the Ministries who worked with the CSP, the RAE suggested that “data literacy” – knowing what data to collect, how to collect it and interpret it, and the general understanding of why collecting quality data is important – is a serious problem for the GoRTT. Furthermore, at the senior level across different administrations the RAE suggested those with powers to make decisions do not always possess the expertise to execute those decisions in line with evidence.
Insight #4: Soft programmes face a general resistance from any GoRTT because their long-term behavioural change logic goes against the dominant moral codes in the society. The suggestion can be made from the data that the CSP played into the familiar systems of hierarchies locally (caste, race and class systems), in terms of how the government and elites feel morally towards the poor; and the CSP as an initiative helping the poor in at risk communities does not fit the dominant sense of morality and discipline locally dominant in the political culture and subsequently found in many GoRTT institutions, which is to “punish the sinner”.
Insight #5: Better communication strategy needed: The RAE clearly documented from all stakeholders that due to human capital issues and poor planning the CSP was not well publicised over its lifespan. As such the public generally did not know what the IDB and GoRTT were doing via the CSP and could not offer support on a mass level when its continuation became unlikely.
We conducted a rapid assessment ethnography of the execution and implementation of the CSP by the GoRTT:
The overall local political culture impacted Governmental decision-making and carried within it the seeds of the discontinuation of the CSP.
Five fundamental insights emerged out of our research:
Insight #1: Local political culture and institutions. The RAE suggested that the logic and rationalities of local politics pivots and functions on short-term thinking, political competition, quick wins and election cycles. In contrast to development agencies who may think and plan projects in terms that are longer or do not coincide with election cycles. The suggestion here is the CSP was victim to the expediencies of local politics first and the expediencies of development planning were a secondary consideration. Or put another way, the institutional structures and cultures of GoRTT and the IDB were made for different purposes.
Insight #2: Senior members of local government often substitute formal processes for informal ones. The RAE suggested there is a tendency amongst some senior members of both main political parties locally to make decisions based on their own knowledge/morality, social connections, or reaction to media coverage. This creates a situation where evidence-based decision-making is often not the main manner through which decisions are taken at the senior level and contributes to a culture of decision-making more generally that is evidence-averse.
Insight #3: Local governmentality is built on culture of data illiteracy. In the context of how individuals make decisions and execute governance (also known as governmentality) within the Ministries who worked with the CSP, the RAE suggested that “data literacy” – knowing what data to collect, how to collect it and interpret it, and the general understanding of why collecting quality data is important – is a serious problem for the GoRTT. Furthermore, at the senior level across different administrations the RAE suggested those with powers to make decisions do not always possess the expertise to execute those decisions in line with evidence.
Insight #4: Soft programmes face a general resistance from any GoRTT because their long-term behavioural change logic goes against the dominant moral codes in the society. The suggestion can be made from the data that the CSP played into the familiar systems of hierarchies locally (caste, race and class systems), in terms of how the government and elites feel morally towards the poor; and the CSP as an initiative helping the poor in at risk communities does not fit the dominant sense of morality and discipline locally dominant in the political culture and subsequently found in many GoRTT institutions, which is to “punish the sinner”.
Insight #5: Better communication strategy needed: The RAE clearly documented from all stakeholders that due to human capital issues and poor planning the CSP was not well publicised over its lifespan. As such the public generally did not know what the IDB and GoRTT were doing via the CSP and could not offer support on a mass level when its continuation became unlikely.