Language-in-Use Living under Militarisation and Insecurity: How Securitisation Discourse Wounds Trinidad

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Resumen

En este artículo se contextualizan los datos de la entrevista de un proyecto de investigación en marcha sobre la militarización de la vida cotidiana en Trinidad, y se explora discursivamente el lenguaje en uso para proporcionar una visión de las experiencias cotidianas de (in) seguridad en St. Barbs, Laventille. Demuestra cómo el lenguaje puede estar implicado en la justificación, el apoyo y la aceptación de vivir en condiciones de militarización e inseguridad. El artículo sugiere que las ideologías, los discursos y las visiones del mundo mediadas masivamente en Trinidad producen y reproducen dentro y por medio del lenguaje una hegemonía cultural que está implicada en la aceptación ritual de una cultura de militarización, hiper-masculinidad e inseguridad. Basándose en los conceptos de drama social y actuación cultural de Victor Turner, esta creciente aceptación implica el consentimiento individual de definiciones de la vida cotidiana que oscurecen las narrativas sociales del racismo histórico, la pobreza estructural y la desventaja acumulativa, y las reemplaza por la creación neoliberal de mitos culpando a la personalidad, la psicología y la moral dudosa de los problemas sociales y la inseguridad. [Caribbean, Trinidad y Tobago, antropología, colonialismo, discurso, política, postcolonial]

Abstract

In this article, interview data from an ongoing research project into the militarization of everyday life in urban Trinidad is contextualized, and language-in-use discursively explored, to provide insight into everyday experiences of (in)security in St. Barbs, Laventille. It demonstrates how language can be implicated in the justification and support for, and the acceptance of, living under conditions of militarization and insecurity. The article suggests that the ideologies, discourses, and worldviews

The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, Vol. 0, No. 0, pp. 1–21. ISSN 1935-4932, online ISSN 1935-4940. © 2018 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/jlca.12341
mass-mediated in urban Trinidad produce and reproduce within and through language a cultural hegemony that is implicated in the ritualized acceptance of a culture of militarization, hypermasculinity, and insecurity. Drawing on Victor Turner’s concepts of social drama and cultural performance, this growing acceptance involves the individual consenting to top–down definitions of everyday life that obscure social narratives of historical racism, structural poverty, and cumulative disadvantage, and replaces them with neoliberal myth-making, blaming personality, psychology, and dubious morality for social problems and insecurity. [Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago, anthropology, colonialism, conflict, discourse, politics, postcolonial]

In the 2013 Global Study on Homicide released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, countries from Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for thirteen of the twenty most murderous nations in the world. One of those thirteen is the twin-island nation of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T), population 1.32 million, in the Southern Caribbean. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) reported a murder total of 2,117 for the five-year period 2009–2013; this equates to an average of 423 murders per year (Seepersad 2016:158). For the period 2000–2010, T&T had a murder rate of 25.1 per one hundred thousand. The average murder rate in the United States of America for the same 2000–2010 period was 5.4 murders per one hundred thousand inhabitants.

As Caribbean criminologist Randy Seepersad (2016: 14) notes:

Crime is one of the leading social problems in T&T and one of the most important threats to public safety. Concerns about crime and violence are expressed daily in the news media and rank high among citizens’ concerns in public opinion polls. An increase in crime and violence, particularly since 2000, has intensified perceptions of insecurity among citizens. The result has been a decline in the public’s trust in the capacity of government, and specifically law enforcement agencies, to deal with this problem. This in turn has intensified the public’s sense of insecurity and weakened the country’s social fabric . . . The only crime that declined in T&T over the 20-year period ending in 2014 was burglary. Murders, woundings and shootings, robberies, and kidnapping showed some level of stability from 1990 to 2000, but then began to increase. The annual number of sexual offences increased from 1990 to 2006, but thereafter, with the exception of 2012, started to decline.

The picture painted in research on T&T is not of a Wild West society, where everyone is prone to random small-arms attacks, but rather violence concentrated in particular urban locales—such as Morvant, Laventille, and River Estate. For example, between January 2013 and May 2017, according to the TTPS, around
20 percent of the 1,820 murders taking place in T&T happened along the eastern edge of the nation’s capital, Port of Spain—in Laventille and its environs—which, not including the San Juan area, accounts for 7.5 percent of the national population. The backdrop to such crime statistics is an insecure national society and a culture of fear. The reaction of the state has been to adopt the language of securitization and to militarize society by declaring war on some of its own citizens (Kerrigan 2015).

The interview data selected and analyzed in this article was collected as part of a qualitative research project into the militarization of everyday life in east Port of Spain. My guides in conducting research in Laventille included a Community Action Officer with the Citizen Security Program, and a resident of Laventille. Since 2014, we have visited three parts of Laventille: Beetham, Eastern Quarry/Picton, and St. Barbs. Using recorded in-depth interviews I spoke with twenty people.

Some examples of language-in-use collected during interviews in St. Barbs with three adult residents are analyzed discursively here to help contextualize the assumptions and information that resident speakers leave uncontested in what they say and feel about their everyday lives and security (Gee 2011: 8). This cultural reality and everyday language contributes to Gramsci’s definition of hegemony, wherein less powerful social groups in society give their spontaneous consent “to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (1971: 12). According to Hurtado and Ercolani (2013: 36):

In Gramscian terms, security became a crucial element in the construction of hegemony—a hegemony that operated not simply between states but below them as a mechanism for binding the civil societies of the West and its aspiring allies. Its self-representation in Hobbesian terms1 of an anarchic security dilemma, masked the deeper global politics of state building, elite recruitment, modernization, military-police training, and societal incorporation. Security, in other words, was never simply about preparing against military threats “out there.” It was always intended as a way of defending common ways of life. It was an inherently cultural practice that was always about more than just the deployment of weapons systems.

In particular, this article textually works up the relationships between “Discourses” (of our social groups and within which we live, such as security and policing) and “discourses” (the language-in-use, or stretches of text, voice, or speech, that we use to show membership and support of such Discourses (Gee 2005). The article shows three residents (two women and one man) of St. Barbs who accept in language top-down, Western, elite Discourses and narratives of militarization, weaponization, and securitization as part of the reality, worldview, and nature of their everyday lives. At the same time, there is a suggestion that these same D/discourses and narratives ignore the political economy, state violence, and consequences of historical racism, structural poverty, and neoliberal militarism.
Laventille

On my first visit to meet with residents in 2014, I was driven into St. Barbs in the back of an armed police vehicle and deposited at a community center high above the city; I was visited at intervals by police until I was picked up again later and driven away. My main informant, a social worker from the area, and my research assistant who has relatives in the area, traveled with me in the back seat of the police jeep and spent time at the community center to support the residents. We helped them with computer training, reading, mentoring, and other educational endeavors.

As one drives into Laventille, the road gradually climbs higher and higher, as the small, windy hill seems to reach for the sky. In much of Laventille, and certainly in St. Barbs, which is one of the higher parts of Laventille, the views are astounding in their beauty and there are many in Trinidad who have never and will never see the views from here. The naked eye can see the entire capital in one direction and the whole central plain of the island in the other. On a good day one can see all the way to the southern tip of the island. One is left in little wonder why, after emancipation, large numbers of previously enslaved persons would move to this pretty hillside.

St. Barbs, or “St. Babs” as locals pronounce it, is a hillside, residential area of Laventille. The police call it “area 3” and it is next to “area 1,” where an officer told me a large number of murders take place in Laventille. If we include the areas at the bottom of the Laventille Hill, such as Beetham and East Dry River, Laventille is home to around one hundred thousand people (Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) Annual Report 2012: 4–6). The Government of T&T (GOTT) calls Laventille and its many parts a “hotspot” area, which fits its definition of dangerous and insecure.

The 2010 national census noted that the two main ethnic groups on the islands are Indo- and Afro-Trinidadians, composing 38 and 37 percent of the national population, respectively, with 24 percent mixed. The ethnic makeup of Laventille from the same census was 80 percent Afro-Trinidadian, 2 percent Indo-Trinidadian, and 17 percent mixed. Scholars note that Laventille and its residents have suffered from anti-black racism, historical inequality, and marginalization for over 180 years (Ryan et al. 1997. 2013). Plantation owners used the law and the police as “distinctive mechanisms of labour force control” against the then ex-slaves to drive them off the Crown lands they were cultivating, so that the ex-slaves’ crops did not compete with the Planters’ own; this was also done to put an end to any emerging retail trade among the poor (Trotman 1986: 33–34). This harassment forced many to join those ex-slaves already relocated to the Laventille Hills, where they were able to live relatively peacefully in an informal squatter community. However, unable to cultivate their own crops and given the poor infrastructural development of the area, many turned to agricultural work in the capital, Port of
Spain; they were forced into exploitative relations and contracts that the plantocracy used—again with the help of the law and police (and a good deal of racial prejudice) to criminalize the Laventille class of people (Trotman 1986: 85).

In understanding how the powerful have denigrated Laventille and regarded it as a space for the refuse of society, Carlton Ottley (1964) notes that the colonial state once identified the inhabited Laventille Hills as somewhere to relocate those suffering with Hansen’s disease (leprosy), away from Port of Spain. Seen through the lens of the “coloniality of power” (Escobar 2004) this suggests that the denigration of the local population, a mistrust of elites, and confrontation with authorities have long been aspects of social relations in this context.

In the twentieth century, the oppression established in the nineteenth century continued to grow structurally and shape social relations. This included cumulative state discrimination in terms of education, jobs, transport, infrastructure, social life, migrant status, economics, and development. While many successful people and cultural waves, such as the steel pan and carnival design, have emerged from Laventille, and the vast area can be described as a mixed-class zone, with lower- to middle-class homes, the historical environmental conditions have for many produced poverty. Over time—and increasingly since the 1990s—this has developed into a problematic culture for a small percentage of locals, mostly young black males, where gang life, delinquency, and violence have become surrogates for normality (Ryan et al. 2013: 31).

This historical context means Laventille and by extension St. Barb’s are not typical communities of T&T. Laventille is largely a poor and historically neglected part of the country. This extreme poverty and neglect must be recognized in any discussion of residents’ attitudes toward a visible police presence. Furthermore, as Seepersad and Bissessar (2013) note, in looking for security and safety, many who live in Laventille experience what anthropologist Philippe Bourgois (1995) refers to as a “culture of terror,” in which organized criminal elements and gangs—such as “Rasta City” or “Muslim City”—control the public space, and politicians divert funds intended for community development to gang leaders on whom they depend to generate electoral support (Ryan et al. 2013; Seepersad and Bissessar 2013). In terms of security, then, many in Laventille must run a gauntlet of militarized police presence and militarized gang control.

Methodology

The twenty qualitative interviews conducted for my “Militarization of Everyday Life” research project include twelve interviews on youth experiences of violence in their communities with sixteen-to-eighteen-year-olds (six males and six females), whom I met through the SERVOL Life Centre² in the Beetham. There, I conducted, with one of my gatekeepers, fifteen weekly spoken word poetry
sessions in 2016. Before this, in 2014, I also spoke with eight adults (aged twenty-two to sixty-five) living in the Eastern Quarry/Picton community and St. Barbs, who were either friends, or the neighbors of family of my gatekeepers. Four of these interviews took place in family homes; the other four took place at the community center.

The language-in-use selections from the three interview transcripts analyzed in this article are from the adult cohort and have been selected to discuss a particular insight from my ongoing fieldwork: this is, the process by which language is implicated in the acceptance of Discourse that interprets violence and crime as primarily the result of the moral failure of young men, and accepts aggressive and often murderous police and military patrols as the solution to local insecurity. The suggestion that follows is that these perceptions reflect a dominant neoliberal ideological narrative that explains social disruption in terms of individual personality failures and ignores structural sociological factors, such as historical racism, structural poverty, and chronic disadvantage.

The first interview (data set B) was conducted with an unemployed single mother of two residing on Laventille Road. The other two interviews were conducted with a retired, male elder of the St. Barbs community (data set C) and his two adult daughters: one was a veterinarian and the other a trainee cadet (data set D). Because of space limitations, I have not included a language-in-use selection from the interview transcript of the veterinarian daughter in this article. All four interviews were conducted on two Sundays in December 2014 in their family homes. As they recounted their experiences of living in St. Barbs, any violent or insecure experiences they volunteered were focused on to elicit further responses connected to their perceptions of security and insecurity. The first interview (data set B) was the most structured, because she was unknown to me beforehand. The remaining three interviews were more open-ended and, as the two young women were relatives of one of my gatekeepers, that interview took the form of an animated mini focus group (data set D). The interview with Ronald (data set C), their father, was more of an oral history: he gave his life story slowly and deliberately as his means to recall information and gather context for his responses, which resulted in his family sitting around to listen, and ask questions.

The language-in-use interview data from the three people recruited for this article is not meant to be representative of the broader community, but rather suggestive of the ways language can be implicated in the justification and support for, and acceptance of, militarization. A useful way to understand discourse analysis as methodology is in the sense that human beings use language to build and destroy things in the world. The words, grammar, and sentence structure a speaker chooses—often unconsciously—suggest a type of worldview and the mental picture a speaker wants us to build (Gee 2011: 73). For example, racists use language and grammar to build a world where racism can be justified, such as when racists
blame inequality on nonwhite laziness or inferiority rather than the cumulative historical legacies of white supremacy and institutional racism; and sexist language does it when, instead of blaming a murderer for a woman’s death, the woman and how she dresses or carries herself is blamed instead.\(^3\)

**Discourses of (In)Security**

Securitization theory as defined in the field of international relations (Balzaq 2011) has, with globalization, filtered around the world (Enloe 2014: 8). The theory supports the GOTT’s response to situations of localized urban violence in historically poor and black neighborhoods as militarized security issues instead of developmental social problems. Yet, as Holbraad and Pedersen (2012: 166) note, securitization theory is a relative concept, the “key premises” of which “are more contingent, historically and culturally, than they pretend,” and securitization theory should be understood “as a cultural artefact in its own right,” with a distinctly “liberal premise,” which is focused on solely blaming individuals for social problems, and ignores the wider sociological context—a central myth-making technique of neoliberalism.

Securitization theory is defined in two key ways. One is as an illocutionary speech act (Oren and Solomon 2015: 313): that is, how governments identify a problem, and teach us what to fear and consider a threat. They then identify an emergency solution (state violence), and attack the “problem” (usually the lives of certain citizens) with militarized force (Holbraad and Pedersen 2012: 166). However, in the weaponized solutions chosen by state actors, there are no anthropological considerations. There is no consideration of the context of the problem, the background to the problem, or the historical evolution of the issues. Historical racism, structural poverty, hegemonic masculinity, and cumulative local disadvantages are ignored and often replaced with ungenerous neoliberal rhetoric about individual failures of morality, parenting, or education. Nor are there any thoughts about the consequences of militarized force, or questions about whether hypermasculinized, militarized force actually improves everyday life or makes things worse in unexpected ways. Instead, lawbreakers simply become “bad people” whom society needs to be protected against. In this scenario, neoliberal governments no longer look for “solutions” to social problems and talk instead about “security.”

In other words, for local social and community life to become the recipient of securitizing mechanisms, such as state violence, there first must be:

An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artifacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a
coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development. (Balzaq 2011: 3)

The result of this discursive politics has been an increased emphasis on the language of securing societies and protecting them—from threats of drugs, crime, arms and ammunition, generalized others, and the general threat of an insecure everyday life—by use of militarized police and military methods.

Securitization theory is also understood as a process from the nonpoliticized, through the politicized, to the securitized:

In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). (Buzan, cited in Holbraad and Pedersen 2012: 170)

For the anthropologist, both these scenarios of illocutionary speech act and processual movement can be likened to Victor Turner’s processional theory of social drama (1980), and its four stages of (1) Breach, (2) Crisis, (3) Redress, and (4) Reintegration. Grimes (1985: 80) observes that for Turner, social drama is the backdrop upon which cultural performances emerge: they are relational. Or put another way, social realities shape cultural responses. Whether this relation is “historical, causal-developmental, theoretical-methodological, or phenomenological-typological” is never clearly defined in Turner’s work with the Ndembu (1985: 80), however, because each possibility is at play at varying times and in various spaces.

Data Analysis

Data Sets B and C—Discourses of Insecurity

In data sets B (first female interviewee) and C (male interviewee) (see Appendix A in Supporting Information), the residents were asked directly to talk about insecurity. Data set B answers the question, “Describe an insecure person in your community”; while data set C answers the question, “How do you describe or define insecurity?” Both data sets have been divided into stanzas: “a language
Data Set B—Discourse of Masculinity

Stanza 1

This stanza orientates speaker B’s discourse. In lines B001 to B002, the hedges and use of the word “probably” suggest the speaker is unsure about her answer to the question. In lines B003 to B005, she injects an “explanatory system” and “culture concept” in order to answer the question with authority (Linde 1993). For example, speaker B believes that the reasons for someone to be insecure include “jealous minded people,” who “want what their friend have.” Taking a surface interpretation, this makes some sense because it appeals to widely held societal stereotypes about robbery being motivated by a politics of envy and poor morality, rather than being about insecurity, desperation, or necessity. The language-in-use also sidesteps larger economic, historical, and social issues and makes insecurity about personal individual failure.

Stanza 2

In lines B008 to B011, the speaker tries to retell their story from Stanza 1. Again as in stanza 1, line B007 suggests the speaker is not an expert on describing an insecure person in their neighborhood. In this stanza, “an insecure person” includes “those who fighting for somebody else, man.” Stanza 2 suggests it is others who are insecure and not the speaker. Those others who are jealous and angry people are those who do not have a man. As in Stanza 1, we see the word “jealous” take center stage in the narrative. Insecurity is defined by absence, and in particular the absence of having a man who, it is implied, brings security and is the envy of others. Jealousy for the speaker is an indication of an insecure person, which suggests a Hobbesian take on human beings. From B012 to B015, the stanza shifts. Here, “shooting and killing” are overtly connected to insecurity, yet those types of insecurity are gone now, and are replaced by “mouth killing,” which seems to be an allusion to gossip between parties who may want what others have.

Stanza 3

In lines B016 to B026, the speaker suggests a meaning for “mouth killing.” Mouth killing is connected to cursing and feuding among family members and seems to be disconnected from actual murder and killing. Insecurity, this suggests, is not
simply about everyday violence, but also about having bad social relationships, which may be connected to a lack of community.

Data Set C—Discourse of Weaponization

Stanza 1

In stanza 1 of this second data set, the male speaker offers feeling insecure but then reorders the sentiment to offer it as a feeling from the past. The personal story in lines C005 to C010 is recruited to provide a theory about cause and effect in the world, and why the speaker once felt insecure. The descriptive clauses provide evidence of danger and this is narrated into an everyday discourse in which everyday life is precarious and insecure—in lines C007–C008. The story then shifts in C010–C013 to build a picture of helplessness and danger. Those who pose the danger are turned into “them” to create distance between the speaker and what makes him insecure. Also, those to whom the speaker could once turn for help are no longer there, suggesting change has happened in the area, which supports the beginning of the story of insecurity being something in the past.

Stanza 2

In the second stanza, the speaker builds on the first stanza to suggest weaponization and gun violence: “I reached a stage to look for something to keep here, yuh know,” becomes an everyday response to the picture of helplessness and danger built in stanza 1. The rest of stanza 2 from C015 to C029 is a recounting of events, suggesting a justification for the prevalence of guns, “when the thing was more hot.”

Stanza 3

Taken together, stanzas 1 and 2 set the scene for justifying why Mr. C was insecure in the past and perhaps a little less so today. Discourses of weaponization and securitization are in full operation to (1) justify the everyday ubiquity of guns and the desire to have one, and (2) to illustrate everyday life as insecure, and specifically, because everyday life in the past was dangerous and needed to be securitized. Stanza 3 from C030 to C048 builds on these textual productions of reality with other stories of gun violence in and around his home. In further mobilization of the Discourses of securitization and weaponization, the second story of guns and rival gangs around his house, and shooting each other, can be taken as the final part of a long “prototypical simulation” or “chain of causality” to describe insecurity in his area (Linde 1993). The issues are beyond him and out of his control. The story does a good job of taking the dangers off the street and
leaving them in the speaker’s home and bedroom. The listener is asked to imagine and build a picture of the shots within the bedroom and the insecurity in the speaker’s body.

The three stanzas taken as a whole identify the issue of insecurity in the area as specifically about guns and men. It details how such insecurity becomes part of everyday life, and it also shows how the necessity of securitization and weaponization enter the bodily rhythms of everyday life.

Data Set D: Everyday Life as a Hobbesian Encounter (Discourse of Militarization)

In data set D (Appendix B in Supporting Information), the female speaker is a cadet, and insecurity is a central, surface theme, explicitly referenced in the question posed: “So from the news it’s clear that joint patrols between army and police officers happen in your area. How has that presence impacted your community life?”

The opening narration element, D001–D006, includes a subtle confirmation of insecurity in everyday life within a wider narrative—with no hedges, no pauses, no gaps; everything is smooth and neat. This suggests a self-confidence about what the solutions to insecurity are. Also important to note in D001–D003 is how securitization through patrols and a police station is something to be happy about. More patrols equal more security. This is the Discourse of securitization. It implies the problem is individuals (the psychological imagination) who need policing, rather than structural, historical, and systemic (the sociological imagination).

A further recruitment and reinforcement of the Discourse of securitization in lines D008–D010 makes normative the idea of a secure space open to all citizens; this space is patrolled and made secure through policing and top-down state action. This can be described as tacit support for a Discourse of state violence, alongside the overt acceptance of the Discourse of securitization and the more implicit acceptance of militarization locally. As such, this might suggest something about how the speaker herself understands other people. From statements D002–D015, it is possible to suggest in political spectrum terms that the speaker views “human nature” and beings as more Hobbesian, and in terms of “all against all” in a war to the death, rather than Rousseauian, and in terms of people being noble and inherently good in nature.

In Mrs. D’s talk, the discourse on securitization does not seem hidden and buried, but extreme and overt. D008 and D015 define safety as concerned with the state and policing: “we need to police” and “need a lot of policing.” However, the speaker separates herself from others in the community and country. By separating herself from other residents perhaps she does not see herself implicated in causing the problems. She has fixed herself. Now it is the state that should come and mend her neighborhood. This suggests a neoliberal moral and psychological “fix
yourself” Discourse, rather than a “fix the system” Discourse of the sociological imagination (Davies 2015; Nehring et al. 2016).

Line D011 is an example of language being recruited to create authority (Gee 2005: 1). The speaker has “a lot of discipline” and as such has a privileged and perhaps moral capacity to speak about what the community and the country need. Policing, she has learned, is the new normal and provides cultural hegemony for successful living; she seems to be saying that this cannot be achieved without top-down supervision.

From D016 to D032, the speaker builds further authority for her claims by recruiting public media figure Dale Enoch to give her story expertise and coherence. This “chain of causality” (Linde 1993) is designed to give her dialogue logical coherence. If “we” need policing as she, Enoch, and the daily mass-mediated Discourse assert as obvious (Morgan and Youssef 2006), then police and the military are a good thing. However, in this narrative there is no recognition of why things have got to this state today. The context and backstory of the present have been erased. Instead, the resident falls back on the failure of human beings and individuals as part of everyday life, leaving invisible larger structural problems, such as the class system, anti-black racism, historical poverty, and social inequalities.

This explanatory system is a simplified mechanism to make sense of a complex world that is “inevitably incomplete and likely to contain errors and contradictions,” yet has “internal linguistic and psychological coherence” (Gaudio and Bialostok 2005: 55). For example, the speaker’s repetition of dominant mass-mediated Discourse and its assumptions about the reasons people need policing, and her notion that “T&T is a culture that needs a lot of policing,” on the surface at least, makes sense; this kind of interpretation is compelling to those who live in lawless times because it appeals to widely held principles about policing and discipline. However, to hold such an opinion about everyone in a country suggests a stereotype that is untenable when juxtaposed with reality. Perhaps the shift from talking about her community in line D014 needs to be softened in relation to its attachment to the culture of the country as a whole: it suggests this textual construction was needed in language, however, in order to support something that is not actually true.

To further justify a worldview that recruits the Discourses of securitization and militarization as necessary in her neighborhood, lines D030 to D037 welcome the police and army working together and, thus, the idea of living under state violence. This implies that a new securitized normal is acceptable to her as part of everyday life. Police and army involvement are defined in line D038 as “help.” This raises the question of how such a worldview excludes and simplifies reality. For example, do the police always help? Do they help everyone equally, across race, class, religion, and sexuality? Is “help” not a simplification of what the police really do? And in whose service are they employed?
From D035 to D052, there is much simplification offered to further support this new militarized and securitized everyday living. In lines D033 and D040, a Discourse of psychology and social deviance is recruited to further justify the securitization of her neighborhood. The speaker is suggesting that social problems can be solved by psychology—how criminals or “deviants” think. There is no recognition of structural causes behind every day “social goods” and conditions (Gee 2005). The speaker suggests in D042–D044 that feelings, and not structural change, are what will make the situation better; this positive psychology approach is a key component of neoliberal myth making (Davies 2015; Nehring et al. 2016).

Simplification from D035 to D052 in terms of the organization of the narrative and her justification of it suggest an internal realization that her description of reality and its fixes are not as simple as she at first thought. From D045 to D052, the speaker hedges and switches Discourses from psychological justification to moral justification. Her story now moves into the suggestion that not everyone will put down the gun, before acknowledging the flaw in the Discourse of securitization. If it only makes some people put down the gun, securitization cannot solve the social problem of insecurity.

Discussion: Gender, Militarization, and Ritual

In the 1990s scholars of the Caribbean began to identify a marginalization of masculinity in local societies (CGRS 1996). As Errol Miller (1991: 93) noted,

> The description of Caribbean societies points to lower-strata men’s marginal positions in the family, role reversal in a small but increasing number of households, boys’ declining participation and performance in the educational system, the greater prospect of men inheriting their fathers’ position in the social structure, the decline in the proportions of men in the highest-paying and most prestigious occupations and the decrease in men’s earning power relative to women’s especially in white collar occupations. While some men, particularly in the highest social strata, have been able to maintain their traditional position in the family, educational system and labour force, the majority are being eclipsed by women rising in all these areas.

Over subsequent decades much has been debated about this “emasculcation of men” (Centre for Gender and Development Studies [CGRS] 1996). Building on the Caribbean feminist approach pioneered by Barriteau (2003), and critical of Miller’s thesis of male marginalization, Hosein (2016) offers a different take on the crisis of masculinity in T&T, which defines it in a specific way for projects on violence. As Hosein notes, research shows that violence in T&T occurs within the family and, as such, “the crisis of masculinity isn’t one of girls doing well in school, it’s one of the continued association between manhood, power and violence,
starting at home.” However, it is not just in the home that such ideas of masculinity emerge and dominate in T&T. They are also manifest in the wider public culture: newspapers, radio stations, television stations, clergy, the government, the police, the military, sport, and popular culture, which rewards definitions of manhood that make masculinity about dominance, authority, leadership, power, and privilege (Barritteau 2003). A small minority of public voices offer more nuanced and evidence-based viewpoints.

Against this cultural backdrop of emic ideas of masculinity, the GOTT on August 21, 2011 declared a limited State of Emergency (SOE) in “hotspot” areas across the country, including St. Barbs. Speaking on live television, the prime minister at the time, Kamla Persad-Bissessar (2011), said the reason for the SOE was because it

would allow for the members of the Defense Force and for persons from the military to have certain powers which allow for powers of search and seizure for powers of arrest, which they do not at present have. What this would do, amongst many other things, is to augment the manpower of the police service. We have 5,000 members of the Defense Force, able-bodied men who are trained, who can assist at this time in the greatest battle that we are facing in the war against crime. This is part of this battle, this is part of the war.

As Enloe notes (2014: 7), persistent “militarisation in a post-war society re-entrenches the privileging of masculinity in both private and public life”; we might ask how this works in practice, however. One way, considered next, is that such desire for, and privileging and reentrenchment of, a colonial militarized hypermasculinity can be imagined step by step as a liminal Turner-esque social drama and system of cultural processes that we can identify via Discourse and language-in-use (1980).

Militarism is a belief that a military ethos is superior to all others. It is “a disparate set of social, cultural, political, and economic practices and discourses through which military objectives become prioritized as a means to secure a society and its ‘way of life’” (Beier 2011: 191); in this, it is a “package of ideas” (Enloe 2014: 7). Influenced by an ideology of militarism, militarization is a process, and can be imagined as a social drama involving the acquisition of armaments by societies to secure “national security.” Militarization includes the tangible accumulation of weapons, the presence of military personnel on the streets among a civilian population, and the involvement and/or inclusion of soldiers in regular law enforcement activities that would otherwise be conducted by the police. In other words, militarism as ideology, and militarization as process, are parts of a multilayered symbolic system “through which military approaches to political problems gain elite and popular acceptance” (Kuus 2009: 546).
Some feminist scholars view militarism as an expression and space of violent hypermasculinity (Barriteau 2003; Enloe 2014), and assert that “militarism and heteronormative gender identities are co-constitutive” (Mama 2013). At its heart, militarism—a foundational part of the colonial encounter, which today takes modernized, neoliberal forms—has core Hobbesian beliefs that mirror definitions of hypermasculinity:

Among those distinctively militaristic core beliefs are: a) that armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions; b) that human nature is prone to conflict; c) that having enemies is a natural condition; d) that hierarchical relations produce effective action; e) that a state without an army is naïve, scarcely modern, and barely legitimate; f) that in times of crisis those who are feminine need armed protection; and g) that in times of crisis any man who refuses to engage in armed violent action is jeopardizing his own status as a manly man. (Enloe 2014: 219)

For anthropology and the sociological imagination, violence and militarization are not long-term solutions for social problems such as historical racism and poverty. Yet, if we return to the narratives of the three residents of St. Barbs, hypermasculinity, weaponization, and the militarization of state forces is desired by each of them as a form of redress for social insecurity; for them, these responses have become culturally acceptable and normal. One way to describe how this culture and practice of militarization is achieved and accepted by an audience is through the speech act and process of securitization Discourse understood as a Turner-esque social drama with all its overdetermination and stages of liminality that can “emplot”6 lives (Turner 1980: 153). Here, it is helpful to draw on Turner’s work to connect the social drama described in the St. Barb’s narratives to the cultural performance of everyday life there. Turner’s ideas are useful in describing how a cultural hegemony supporting class warfare, structural privilege, and social inequalities in society is achieved through a ritualizing process of acceptance to Discourses of hypermasculine militarization, weaponization, and securitization:

ritual . . . does not portray a dualistic, almost Manichaean, struggle between order and void, cosmos and chaos, form and indeterminacy, with the former always triumphing in the end. It is, rather, a transformative self-immolation of order as presently constituted, even sometimes a voluntary sparagmosor self-dismemberment of order, in the subjunctive depths of liminality. (Turner 1980: 164)

On a societal level, the first stage of Turner’s model of social drama—the breach—can be described as a longstanding, multidirectional, and problematic crisis of violent masculinity in the Caribbean, which is a symptom of longstanding international racism, historical inequalities, and underdevelopment, euphemistically-phrased by the Prime Minister of this twin-island nation state as: “The current
crime spree”; “wanton acts of violence and lawlessness”; and “gang activity.”7 Turner describes the second stage of the social drama as the “Crisis,” which is a stage of insecurity. Male violence, lawlessness, and a high murder rate are supposedly beyond the reach of locally led, evidence-based solutions to longstanding social problems; it can only be fixed through reference to a globalized hypermasculine “security” regime. This is securitization as illocutionary act. Hence, the GOTT, recruiting the best practices of racialized, Western, globalized law enforcement, mainly derived from the global North, and particularly the United States (Enloe 2014: 8), offers militarization as its solution to social problems.

For Turner, it is the third stage of a social drama—redress—where liminality and transition take place:

redress: 1) evokes rituals and other cultural performances; and 2) gives rise to reflexivity (performances in which a society can contemplate itself). If we think of cultural performances as derived from social performances, we must look for the origins of cultural performances not in social drama in general, but in redress, the third phase of social drama. Redress occurs when the judiciary proceedings and religious ritual provide symbolic feedback during a crisis. (Grimes 1985: 81)

In the narratives of the three residents in St. Barbs, spaces of redress may be seen in their acceptance of “the judiciary proceedings and religious ritual” produced as justification for the GOTT’s regular and ritualized response of hypermasculine, militarized securitization to what the GOTT describe as crises of crime and violence and not social problems. Turner’s model suggests one way in which residents may consent to their own domination by military power.

In narrative D, a respondent sees the militarized GOTT response to the crisis in her area in terms of Grimes’s “symbolic feedback,” and something she is “elated” about. Other features of her narrative include the following: the social problem is individuals who need policing rather than structural and historical conditions; a secure space open to all people is one that is patrolled and made secure through policing; militarized policing is the new normal for successful living; the problem is T&T culture; and the police and army are here to help.

On the surface, such responses to insecurity appear logical, but such logic requires discursive building blocks to sustain it. Of course, there are multiple reasons for resident D’s suggestions. But one way to understand them is the discourse analysis framework suggested by Gee (2011). First, it can be seen that their language-in-use supports class warfare, structural privilege, and social inequalities. Second, “the related D/discourses” of militarization, weaponization, and securitization beneath the surface are used to reinforce, emplot, and ritualize narratives about reality. Third, the political work and social goods being brought into play—ideas about insecurity, masculinity, and militarism—are partly constructed within the resident’s text making.
Similarly, in narrative B, a list of features and language-in-use from the narrative can be identified: an insecure person is jealous and envious; men are worth fighting for; the speaker suggests insecurity is a personal failure; it is others who are insecure and not the speaker; those who are jealous and angry are those who do not have a man; and “mouth killing” is a reference to social insecurity. Insecurity to this speaker is defined by absence, and in particular the absence of having a man. In the context of the big Discourses supporting this narrative, instead of militarism and militarization, masculinity is enacted here as the way to improve security. Similar to narrative D, the speaker is able to disconnect her language from discourses of history, sociology, and structure, and replaces them with a men-as-protector logic familiar in Discourses of securitization and militarization.

Lastly, the features of narrative C include personal feelings of insecurity, helplessness, and danger; everyday life as precarious and insecure; weaponization as an everyday response to helplessness and danger; issues are out of his control; and the issue of insecurity in the area is specifically about guns and men. In this narrative, the language-in-use demonstrates where and why the speaker supports weaponization as a valid response to insecurity and top-down discourses of securitization. Second, we can “disclose the related D/discourses” about the everyday and the mundane and how this, for the speaker, has been infiltrated by violence. Third, the political work and social goods being spoken about concern masculinity and weaponization as both the causes of, and the solutions to, local problems as textualized in language.

According to Turner, the final stage of the social drama is “reintegration.” Here, residents have reflexively translated lived experiences and embodiments of the effects of (in)security into a specific narrative that makes sense to them (Grimes 1985: 81). This is how the original breach of the social drama can be healed culturally. For Turner (1980: 168–9), this healing is not a circular return, but rather a transformative new point or destination. Having satisfied the liminal stage of redress, where everyday insecurity called for action, the situation is transformative because reintegration is a space where securitization and hypermasculine, neoliberal militarization is now desired and accepted in language and logic as a new everyday cultural performance. The social drama becomes the learned cultural performance. The cultural hegemony of securitization and its implications for local culture are achieved. The state’s solution, after all, is more “security,” rather than progressive social change.

Conclusion

According to the Catholic Church, Saint Barbara or St. Barbs for short, was the daughter of a rich pagan tyrant called Dioscorus, who lived in the fourth century. He brought his daughter up as a heathen who worshiped paganism, and locked
her away in a tower to control her and ensure no one saw her beauty. Over time, Barbara found prayer, was baptized in secret, and turned away from pagan gods. She honored the Holy Trinity by having three windows included in a bathhouse her father was having built, and refused her father’s wish that she should marry.

Dioscorus did not take well to his daughter’s rebellion, conversion, or symbolism, and rejected her before a tribunal. As a result, Barbara was brutally beaten and tortured, before being beheaded by her father. The story continues that God punished those responsible for Barbara’s torture and punishment, striking Dioscorus down with a bolt of lightning before hurrying him to judgment.

According to the Church, the moral of this story is that the life of St. Barbs can remind people that while there is an abundance of anger in the world, being close to God can help overcome the urge to let anger control us. In the twenty-first century language of this project, in a world full of danger, male violence, and insecurity, it is only by listening to the powerful and dedicating oneself to their vision of the world that security can be achieved.

However, by accepting the logic of the powerful, people become complicit through language in consenting to a top-down power structure that is not invested in solving social problems equitably. Instead, it permits and promotes an increasing cultural acceptance of racialized and class-based security solutions to social problems, which punish some more than others. Security solutions cannot mend collective social problems. Residents of St. Barbs, in this sense, are akin to the saint after whom their area is named. Much as Dioscorus once sentenced Barbara to living in a tower, the suggestion here is that language itself can contribute to people feeling trapped, with no escape and no alternative; they learn to accept the top-down version of events. This can be understood as a form of depoliticization, where potential remedies for the world’s social problems, such as structural change through collective action, are replaced by a neoliberal, state-sanctioned Discourse of militarized security that is incapable of progressive social change because of the problematic consequences of militarization for both genders (Barritteau 2003; Enloe 2014: 8).

Extra police patrols, including those undertaken by the army, reference real life dangers, and the militarized policing of crime areas appeals to widely held fears, as well as to ideas about how top-down force (i.e., state violence) is the best way to deal with people and areas that have a degree of lawless danger. In a context of state violence, the biography and history of people’s lives and actions, of social problems, and the issues people live with, are removed and replaced by a simplistic worldview, devoid of context. It becomes normative and simple to consent to, and no longer question, the idea that solutions to long-term social problems are violence, punishment, and death by police. People lose their ability to question such representations of reality. This might be one answer to the question
of how and why mouths kill, and one example of the implicit ways the Discourse of securitization wounds T&T.

Notes

1Here, and throughout this article, the phrase “Hobbesian,” references the worldview of seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who understood human beings as inherently bad; and who could only be brought together peacefully in a civil society via the universal submission to an absolute authority, otherwise they would continue to supposedly experience life as a nasty, brutish, and continuous fight of all-against-all.

2SERVOL is a service organization engaged in educational and community-based efforts to strengthen the family unit by providing support and education for parents, children, and adolescents.

3In Port of Spain in 2016, former Mayor Tim Kee was forced to resign because of such victim blaming.

4According to Deflam (1991: 91-94), ”The social dramas among the Ndembu exhibit a processual form (Turner uses the term ’processional’), following a pattern of four phases: (1) a breach of regular norm-governed social relationships between persons or groups of a social unit; (2) a crisis or extension of the breach, unless the conflict can be sealed off quickly; (3) adjustive and redressive mechanisms brought into operation by leading members of the social group; and (4) reintegration of the disturbed social group or social recognition of an irreparable breach or schism”.

5”By ’politics’ I mean how social goods are thought about, argued over, and distributed in society. ‘Social goods’ are anything that a group of people believes to be a source of power, status, value, or worth, whether this be ’street smarts,’ academic intelligence, money, control, possessions, verbal abilities, ’looks,’ age, wisdom, knowledge, technology literacy, morality, ’common sense,’ and so on through another very long list” (Gee 2005: 2).

6Turner uses the term ”emplotment” in his writings (1980:153). Emplotment is related to historiography and means “the assembly of a series of historical events into a narrative with a plot” (Accessed January 5, 2018. http://www.definations.net/emplotment). It is a way to talk about change and transformation over time as process; and to capture the nexus of historical events, social structure, and cultural performance.

7These verbatim quotes can be found in the Trinidad Express newspaper article “PM Declares State of Emergency,” Trinidad Express, August 22, 2011. See Persad-Bissessar (2011).

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s website:

**Appendix A:** Data Sets B and C - Discourses on Insecurity.
**Appendix B:** Data Set D - Everyday Life as a Hobbesian Encounter.